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Emotion and Agency in Zhuāngzǐ 
Chris Fraser 
University of Hong Kong 
 
Among the many striking features of the philosophy of the Zhuāngzǐ ???? is that 
it advocates a life unperturbed by emotions, including even pleasurable, positive emotions 
such as joy or delight.1 Many of us, philosophers and lay people alike, see emotions as an 
ineluctable part of life. Indeed, we may consider appropriate emotional responses to 
beneficial or harmful situations a crucial component of a well-developed moral sensitivity 
and a good life. The Zhuangist view of emotion challenges such commonsense views so 
radically that we might regard it as a test case for the fundamental plausibility of the 
anthology’s ethical vision: if the Zhuangist stance on emotion is untenable, then other aspects 
of Zhuangist ethics may founder as well. In this essay, I explore a Zhuangist approach to 
emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version 
of a Zhuangist view of emotion passes the “basic plausibility” test. Whether or not we 
ultimately agree with this view, there are reasonable considerations in its favor. 
The exact view I will discuss is not presented explicitly in the text. It is a construction 
or interpolation from theoretical claims in different parts of the anthology. I suggest, 
however, that views roughly like this one, or largely overlapping it, probably underlie and 
motivate statements in many parts of the Zhuāngzǐ.2 The view I will examine is not the only 
                                                           
1
 Interesting comparisons and contrasts can be drawn between the Zhuangist stance on emotion and that of 
Hellenistic schools such as the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics or of early modern European writers such as 
Montaigne, Lipsius, and Spinoza. These relations are beyond the scope of this essay, but it is worth remarking 
that despite some similarities to these Western thinkers, Zhuangist views appear to be unique in their content, 
conceptual structure, and theoretical grounding. 
2
 Like most texts attributed to the pre-Qín “various masters” (??), the Zhuāngzǐ is an anthology of brief, 
roughly paragraph-length writings by different hands. (For a discussion of the highly composite structure of 
early Chinese texts, see Boltz [2005].) The Zhuāngzǐ’s hundreds of different parts are linked thematically by a 
network of doctrinal family resemblances and historically or genealogically probably by numerous intersecting 
teacher-student lineages, as the texts were likely composed and transmitted among groups of teachers and 
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position on the emotions in the Zhuāngzǐ, but it is especially interesting philosophically, and 
it is highly relevant to contemporary ethics and action theory. 
For convenience, let me give the view to be discussed a label: the “Virtuoso View” of 
emotions. This is an allusion to the core Zhuangist ethical concept of dé ?, whose content 
overlaps that of notions such as virtuosity, power, potency, virtue, vitality, charisma, 
adroitness, proficiency, and capacity. As I will explain, the Virtuoso View is deeply 
intertwined with various Zhuangist conceptions of dé. Another reason for dubbing this the 
“Virtuoso View” is that I believe it is a roughly accurate description of the psychological 
state manifested in virtuoso performance of arts, skills, and other activities. 
I will begin by describing the Virtuoso View and sketching its theoretical foundation, 
which ultimately involves many aspects of Zhuangist thought, including claims about human 
agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. 
Next, I will consider several objections to it and will attempt to defend it, or at least a 
modified version of it, against these objections. I will argue for three major theses. First, the 
Virtuoso View is easily intelligible—especially given Zhuangist assumptions about 
physiology—and largely, if not entirely, defensible. Indeed, to some extent it reflects many 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
students. The anthology is organized as thirty-three “books” or “chapters,” each a collection of short stories or 
remarks, often grouped loosely by theme. Typically, these stories and remarks share a broadly interrelated 
doctrinal orientation, but they do not purport to present a unified or coherent set of doctrines. Even a 
conservative count, such as Liu Xiaogan’s (1994), attributes at least four different authorial or doctrinal voices 
to the corpus. My own view is that there are almost certainly many more, and that even the seven so-called 
“inner chapters” that many scholars attribute to the historical Zhuāng Zhōu ?? are most probably the work of 
several different authors. (For a detailed critique of the view that the “inner chapters” represent an authorially 
privileged, chronologically early, or doctrinally canonical section within the anthology, see Klein [forthcoming]. 
For related arguments, see too Fraser [1997].) In general, however, because little historical information is 
available on the authorship or provenance of individual parts of the Zhuāngzǐ, I believe the appropriate 
interpretive approach is to focus on the texts, not their unknown authors. That is, instead of attempting to 
reconstruct the systematic thought of one or more particular authors—a project that simply cannot be carried out 
convincingly, given the nature of the various “books” and our lack of historical information about 
them—interpreters should focus on exploring and reconstructing the rich discourses on various themes found in 
the anthology. Given the literary and physical structure of the collection, the genealogical relationships between 
its component texts, and their shared broad outlook, we can expect different parts to explore common themes 
from a variety of angles, presenting views that may overlap substantially but also diverge significantly. From 
reconstructions of such discourses, we can move on to consider or develop systematic positions that are 
grounded in Zhuangist motifs and views, but not necessarily explicitly presented in or endorsed by all parts, or 
any particular part, of the anthology. 
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people’s commonsense view of emotion. Second, and more important, it reflects a crucial 
insight into a fundamental dichotomy at the core of human agency: the unavoidable conflict 
within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, 
detached one. Few philosophers, East or West, have called attention to this tension at the root 
of human agency, but I will draw comparisons between the Zhuāngzǐ and two who have: 
Heidegger (1962) and Nagel (1979). Third, I will suggest that certain problems or conflicts 
arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament 
and thus are not mere conceptual defects. Thus even if we do not find the Virtuoso View 
wholly convincing, we can nevertheless gain much insight from it.  
An Emotional Predicament 
A story in “The Human World,” Book 4 of the Zhuāngzǐ, illustrates the general stance 
I am calling the Virtuoso View. The story relates the predicament of Zǐgāo, Duke of Shè ?
???, a high official of the powerful southern state of Chǔ ?, who is dispatched by the 
King of Chǔ on an important diplomatic mission to the formidable northern state of Qí ?. 
Within hours of receiving his assignment, Zǐgāo finds himself feverish with anxiety. 
Recalling the words of his mentor Zhòng Ní ?? (Confucius), he remarks that only a 
person of dé ? can handle affairs without bringing one of two kinds of trouble upon 
himself—either “troubles with the yīn and yáng” (????—that is, health problems) or 
“troubles in the human dào” (????, problems in human relations and affairs) (4/36–37).3 
In his case, though he has yet to engage in the matter, his health is already suffering, and if 
the mission fails, he will surely face the king’s wrath and thus difficulties in human relations. 
As a minister, he says, these two sources of distress are too much for him to bear (4/38–39).  
                                                           
3
 Citations to the Zhuāngzǐ give chapter and line numbers from Zhuāngzǐ Yǐndé ?????? (A Concordance 
to Zhuāngzǐ), Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 20 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1956). 
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So Zǐgāo is caught in an inescapable, stressful predicament: he has a difficult 
assignment that he cannot decline; failure will bring punishment; and he is sick with anxiety. 
His emotional state is interfering with his ability to function normally and is actually harming 
him physically. Can Zhòng Ní offer any advice? 
In response, Zhòng Ní makes several general points about handling potentially 
stressful responsibilities and situations.4 The gist of his remarks is that in nearly any area of 
life, we encounter situations and pressures about which we “cannot do anything” (????). 
The text dubs these “the inevitable” (bù dé yǐ  ???). For instance, we are born into a 
family and must care for our parents, an inescapable aspect of our “fate” (mìng ?). We are 
born into a political society and must comply with requirements it imposes on us—another 
inescapable part of life, which the text calls “duty” (yì ?). To live well, we must cope with 
these and other inevitable matters while maintaining the health of our own heart (xīn ?)—in 
most early Chinese thought the nexus of agency. To do so is to exercise dé (virtuosity, power, 
potency, adroitness). 
As to serving your own heart, without sorrow or joy alternating before you, to know 
what you can’t do anything about and be at ease with it as with fate, this is the 
pinnacle of dé. As a minister or son, there are bound to be matters that are inevitable. 
Act on the facts of the matter and forget yourself. What leisure will you have for 
delighting in life and hating death? (4/41–44)5 
A key to reaching “the pinnacle of dé” is to recognize and be at ease or peace (?) with the 
inevitable, just as we accept various aspects of our fate, such as our race, place of birth, sex, 
or height.6 Then, according to the text, intense emotions such as sorrow and joy, or delight in 
life and hatred of death, will cease to disturb us. Only by achieving such equanimity can one 
preserve one’s health and employ the tact and discretion needed to handle complex affairs 
                                                           
4
 I discuss these points in more detail in Fraser (2008). 
5
 ????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? 
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effectively. Zǐgāo should simply proceed according to the facts of the situation and “forget” (
?) himself, by ceasing to worry about his own welfare or preferences. Zhòng Ní later adds 
that “to let your heart wander by riding along with things and to nurture your center by 
entrusting yourself to the inevitable is to reach the ultimate” (4/52–53).7 Zǐgāo must learn to 
maintain equanimity and nurture his psycho-physical “center”—the heart or chest and the qì 
? or spirit (shén ?) within it—by accepting the inevitable and calmly wandering along 
with his circumstances. 
The Virtuoso View of emotion corresponds roughly to the descriptions this passage 
associates with dé. “Virtuosos,” or persons of dé, accept the inevitable without experiencing 
intense emotions. They nurture an inner state of calm and ease, without consciously dwelling 
on their own welfare. This state enables them to attend fully to their circumstances and 
competently handle matters at hand. Such people are not utterly emotionless: they experience 
a general sense of ease or peace, and they retain affective commitments to the welfare of their 
parents, for example. (The text implies that they embody the virtues of xiào ? and zhōng 
?—family devotedness and political loyalty.) But they are free from strong, disruptive 
emotions, whether pleasant, positive ones such as joy or unpleasant, negative ones such as 
sorrow. Roughly this sort of psychological state probably occurs commonly in the virtuoso 
performance of arts or skills. For instance, a tennis or basketball “virtuoso” who has just 
scored a point or committed an error does not dwell on it and may experience only a weak 
emotional response, if any. The virtuoso maintains psychophysical equilibrium and 
immediately shifts focus to the next shot or play.     
                                                                                                                                                                                       
6
 Fate, or mìng ?, refers to facts regarded as “mandated” and beyond our control, such as hereditary traits or 
socio-historical facts.  
7
 ??????????????????? 
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Emotion and Virtuosity 
Numerous Zhuāngzǐ passages instantiate variants of the Virtuoso View. These 
consistently link the notion of dé to affective equanimity, acceptance of fate (?), recognition 
of one’s place in the flux of nature, and affective identification with the Great Dào ??,8 or 
the totality of nature and its constituent processes. 
Consider, for instance, two of the exemplars of dé whose stories are collected in Book 
5, “Signs of Full Virtuosity.” Wáng Tái ??, an ex-convict amputee with as many disciples 
as Confucius, is said to have achieved a “constant heart” (??) grounded in a combination 
of cognitive and affective attitudes (5/1–13). He understands and attends to the respects in 
which the myriad things are “one,” or form a single spatial-temporal whole, and thus 
experiences no loss when things alternate or transform. As a result, he has no preferences and 
is emotionally unperturbed by even the greatest of changes, such as death or cataclysm, all of 
which he accepts as if fixed by fate and thus beyond his control. He feels as little emotion 
over the amputation of his foot (a criminal punishment inflicted on him in the past) as he 
would the loss of a clump of dirt. He discerns and preserves what is non-dependent (??) in 
himself, namely his “ancestor” (?)—which I interpret here as the mysterious source of one’s 
capacity for agency. These attitudes allow him to “let his heart wander in the harmony of 
dé.”9 One might think that Wáng’s acceptance of fate and indifference toward his body 
might produce passivity or defeatism. But the text instead depicts these attitudes as 
empowering: he is said to be at ease in the world as if it were his palace and to view the 
world as a vast storehouse of resources available to him.   
                                                           
8
 I use this expression—borrowed from the views attributed to Shèn Dào ?? in Zhuāngzǐ Book 33—to refer 
to the dào constituted by the totality of things, events, patterns, and processes in the cosmos. It contrasts with 
the various particular dào followed by particular creatures, communities, or phenomena. 
9 ??????? 
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Āi Tái Tuō ??? (5/31–49) is a horrendously ugly man whose mysterious 
charisma causes people to find him intensely attractive. His ability to win trust and affection 
without saying or doing anything in particular is attributed to his “capacity” or “stuff” (cái 
?) being “whole” (?), while his dé is preserved within and not manifested in his physical 
form. The text associates our “capacity” with “what employs the body” (????), implying 
that it refers to inner faculties or capabilities that either constitute or enable agency. The 
text’s account of one’s “capacity being whole” emphasizes preserving affective harmony (?) 
and ease (?) in the face of unknowable and uncontrollable change, or the “march of fate” (
???). One is to allow no “openings” through which the vagaries of fortune can “enter” (
?) to disrupt the harmony (??) of one’s spirit. Indeed, for this text, dé just is the 
cultivation of perfect inner equanimity or harmony.10 Such psychological harmony enables 
Āi to “encounter things and generate the opportune moment in his heart.”11 An agent whose 
“capacity is whole” is no passive victim of fate, but exerts agency by creating opportunities 
from his circumstances.   
Another example of the virtuoso view comes from the story of the four friends in 
“The Great Ancestral Teacher” (6/45–60), who see “life and death, presence and absence” (
????) as “a single whole” (??). One of them, Zǐyú ??, develops a disfiguring 
terminal disease. He marvels at his condition, yet his heart remains “at ease and 
unconcerned” (????). Asked whether he detests the disease, he remarks:12  
Gain is a matter of the opportune moment, loss a matter of flowing along. If we are at 
ease with the moment and dwell in the flow, sorrow and delight cannot enter. This is 
what in ancient times was called “release from bonds.” As to those who cannot 
                                                           
10 ???????? 
11 ??????? 
12
 A nearly identical remark appears in the story of Lǎozǐ’s death in “The Key to Nurturing Life” ??? 
(3/17–19). 
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release themselves, there are things that bind them. Yet things do not win out over 
Nature; it’s always been so.13 What would I hate about it? (6/52–53).14 
With equanimity, creativity, and good cheer, Zǐyú explains that he will adapt to make the best 
of whatever physical changes the course of his disease brings. Perhaps it will transform his 
left arm into a rooster, in which case he will keep the night watch; perhaps it will transform 
his right arm into a crossbow, in which case he will shoot game. Perhaps it will transform his 
buttocks into cartwheels, in which case he will go off for a joyride (6/50–52). He regards the 
disease not as impeding his powers of agency, but as providing novel opportunities to employ 
them.  
Two further illustrations come from Book 21, “Tián Zǐ Fāng” ???. Sūn Shū Áo 
??? (21/62–65) was thrice promoted to premier of his state but took no glory in his rank; 
thrice he was dismissed but was unperturbed about it. His explanation of this equanimity has 
two basic parts, both of which echo ideas in the Zǐgāo story discussed above. First, he is 
emotionally unaffected by whatever lies beyond his control: “Since I regard gain and loss as 
not up to me, I wasn’t upset, that’s all.”15 Second, he invests value only in inherent features 
of his self or activity. If honor and success lie in the political post, then he never really 
possessed them in the first place. If instead they lie in him, then they do not lie in the post, 
and losing the post does not entail losing them. Sūn could not care less about social rank, as 
he already achieves fulfillment through his own free and easy wandering.  
Finally, a dialogue between Confucius ?? and Lǎo Dān ?? (21/24–38) ties the 
Virtuoso View to a form of “ultimate happiness.” The text presents emotional equanimity as 
a crucial aspect of “letting the heart wander in the beginning of things,”16 an activity that Lǎo 
                                                           
13
 A similar passage at 3/17 refers to the failure to accept change and “dwell in the flow” without emotional 
disruption as “fleeing from Nature and turning one’s back on reality” (???[?]?). 
14
????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????? 
15
 ?????????????????? 
16 ??????? 
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Dān describes as “ultimate beauty and ultimate happiness” (????). The text’s 
explanation of such wandering stresses three points. First, it is characterized by “great 
constancy” (??), or constancy on a macro, general level, insofar as it is an activity that 
continues undisturbed despite changing particular circumstances. Second, this constancy is 
achieved by identifying with the world as a whole (??), understood as the totality or “one” 
(?) that incorporates the myriad things. This identification is apparently not construed as a 
loss of the individual self, but an extension of it, such that the self is understood as a part of 
and through its relation to the totality. Third, such constancy is marked by affective 
equanimity, here construed as an absence of strong positive or negative emotions. The agent 
ceases to be emotionally disturbed by change, such as bodily injury, life or death, gain or 
loss, or fortune or misfortune. A person who follows the Great Dào is “free” or “released” (
?) from psychological disturbances caused by affective responses to change. Achieving such 
a state is indicative of great dé.  
The Virtuoso View 
These accounts, coupled with Zhòng Ní’s advice to Zǐgāo, present a general 
eudaimonistic ideal—the life of dé or virtuosity—in which emotional equanimity is a major 
element. The Zhuangist virtuoso “nurtures his center” (??) or keeps his “capacity whole” (
??) by maintaining a constant (?), harmonious (?) psychological state of “being at ease 
with the moment and dwelling in the flow” (????). He ceases to have strong 
preferences, and intense emotions such as joy (?), anger (?), sorrow (?), delight (?), 
shock and fear (??), and anxiety and worry (??) rarely or never occur and do not “enter” 
(?) and affect his psycho-physiological locus of agency (variously referred to as the heart 
?, the chest ?, the center ?, the “spirit storehouse” ?? or “spirit tower” ??, the 
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“dwelling” ?, or the spirit ?).17 His heart thus remains “empty” (?),18 and he achieves 
“release” (?) from things. Changes in his circumstances do not disturb his psyche; he ceases 
to worry about success or failure, survival or death, and even “forgets” (?) himself. He 
recognizes that much of what happens is beyond his control and accordingly accepts “the 
inevitable” (???) or “fate” (?). Rather than inducing a passive, apathetic fatalism, 
however, this realistic appraisal of the limits of personal efficacy liberates the virtuoso by 
shifting the focus of agency to what he can control. He achieves a form of flexible, 
responsive agency that is self-sufficient or independent (??) of contingent factors, in that it 
focuses on “wandering” (?) through the world by flexibly adapting to and “riding along with 
things” (??).19 According to some passages (such as the stories about Zǐgāo or Wáng Tái), 
this capacity for flexible wandering renders the virtuoso’s actions more effective, as he is 
better prepared to find creative, adaptive responses to changing situations. Moreover, 
although the virtuoso is free of disruptive emotions, he is not utterly affectless. He 
experiences a general positive sense of ease or calm, harmony, and satisfaction or fulfillment 
and, according to some passages, a form of happiness or delight, good cheer, and playful 
enjoyment or zest for life.20    
These descriptions dovetail with perhaps the most well-known statement about 
emotions in the Zhuāngzǐ, the claim in one passage of “Signs of Full Virtuosity” that the sage 
“has human form but lacks human affects” (5/54).21 As the text makes clear, the import is 
not that the sage lacks all emotion. It is that “shì-fēi [right/wrong, this/not-this] do not obtain 
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 See, e.g., 21/44–45, 4/53, 19/14, 21/32, 5/45, 19/62, 19/25, 19/12–13. 
18
 On the links between the Zhuangist view of emotion and emptiness, see Fraser (2008). 
19 As Puett observes, for the Zhuāngzǐ, “the liberation that comes from no longer being dependent on things 
precisely involves an acceptance of the order of Heaven” (2003, 255). The order of Heaven (?, also Nature) 
corresponds to what the text calls “the inevitable” or “fate.”  
20
 As Ivanhoe (2010) notes, the spontaneous, nature-guided character of virtuoso action produces a deep sense 
of ease, security, confidence, and peace. 
21 ?????????? 
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in him” (5/54).22 The ensuing dialogue between Huì Shī ?? and Zhuāngzǐ clarifies that 
“lacking affects” (??) here refers to the sage “not harming himself internally with likes and 
dislikes, but constantly going along with the self-so, without adding to life” (5/57–58).23 
These remarks employ different terminology but converge in spirit with the descriptions 
above. The key ideas are that the virtuoso is not committed to any particular set of value 
distinctions (shì-fēi) and thus does not allow preferences or aversions to harm or disrupt him, 
as Zǐgāo’s worries about his assignment injured him. Instead, he follows along with the 
inherent course or patterns of things, without attempting to help them along.   
What I am calling the Virtuoso View, then, is just the stance toward emotions or other 
affective states that emerges from this more general eudaimonistic ideal, which, following the 
Zhuāngzǐ itself, we may call “wandering” (?).24 The Virtuoso View identifies a state of 
affective harmony, resilience, and equanimity concerning contingent, transitory 
circumstances that is a central feature of the life of wandering and dé.25 The details of and 
motivation for advocating this state rest partly on the Zhuangist account of the ontology of 
emotion. So let me next sketch how Zhuangist writers probably understood emotions and 
their effect on us.  
Zhuangist Ontology of Emotion 
Ontologically, in early China emotions were generally regarded as states of the qì ? 
that constitutes the agent’s qíng ? (affections, constitution, status),26 which is the active, 
                                                           
22 ??????? 
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 ??????????????????? 
24
 For a detailed discussion of “wandering,” see Fraser (forthcoming). 
25
 The centrality of the Virtuoso View to the wandering ideal means that, as Kupperman (1999) suggests, a core 
part of the Zhuangist ethical project is to “educate the emotions” so as to lead agents to live more flourishing 
lives. 
26
 For discussions of early Chinese views of the structure of emotions, see Puett (2004) and Chan 
(forthcoming). I have especially benefited from Chan’s detailed analysis, although my own interpretation of the 
Zhuangist ontology of emotions differs somewhat from his, primarily in assigning a less significant role to yù 
? (urges, desires) and in interpreting qíng ? as the actualized state of xìng ?. 
12   
actualized dimension of the agent’s xìng ? (dispositional nature).27 For the Zhuāngzǐ, 
emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow, and delight appear to be caused by the agent’s relation 
to “external things” (??)—that is, persons, objects, or situations. The emotion-producing 
relation is established by the agent’s adopting toward things either cognitive-evaluative 
attitudes such as shì-fēi ?? (this versus not-this, approval versus rejection) or preferences 
and aversions (hào-wù ??, like versus dislike).28 The operative relation is metaphorically 
characterized as a “bond” or “tie” (???). The point of the metaphor is probably that the 
agent adopts fixed cognitive-evaluative attitudes that in effect “bind” her to particular things, 
preventing her from freely following along with and adapting to circumstances.29 A likely 
psycho-physiological explanation of such “bonds” is that the agent’s attitudes cause her 
attention and qì to become fixated on some approved or disapproved, preferred or disliked 
thing. This fixation produces emotions—pleasant, excited, agitated, or painful qíng 
states—according to whether or not circumstances accord with the agent’s approvals or 
preferences.  
Since these “bonds” are produced by the discriminating activity of the heart (?)—the 
same general activity that is the basis for cognition—emotions are intertwined with and 
grounded in cognitive judgments.30 Without a shì-fēi judgment that something does or does 
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 I take this to be the import of Xúnzǐ’s well-known statement that qíng is the “stuff” of xìng ?????? 
(Xúnzǐ, Book 22). 
28
 Such attitudes and preferences may themselves also have an affective aspect, as indicated by their inclusion 
in discussions of the affects (e.g., 5/54, 31/30?? For the Zhuāngzǐ, there is probably no strict distinction between 
cognitive, evaluative, and affective attitudes; shì attitudes and preferences may inherently incorporate a positive 
affective component, fēi attitudes and aversions a negative one. For more on the affective content of shì-fēi 
attitudes, see Fraser (2011). 
29
 Such fixed attitudes contrast with the approach advocated in Zhuangist texts such as “Discourse on Evening 
Things Out” (???) and “Autumn Waters” (??) that, instead of committing to fixed shì-fēi attitudes, the 
agent should adjust evaluative distinctions freely in response to different or changing circumstances. The agent 
who fluidly adjusts her shì-fēi attitudes in response to the facts of the situation will experience emotional 
equanimity, as she has no fixed shì-fēi attitudes that bind her to things and thus disrupt the free-flowing 
equilibrium of her qì.  
30
 Chan (forthcoming) correctly notes the importance of a cognitive dimension in the Zhuangist understanding 
of emotion. For a discussion of other aspects of this cognitive dimension, see Fraser (2008). Compare too Wong 
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not belong to some kind (lèi ?) or thing (wù ?) toward which the agent holds an 
evaluative attitude—approval or disapproval, preference or aversion—emotions will not 
arise. Changes in cognitive attitudes can thus be expected to bring about changes in 
emotional states.31 Since in early Chinese thought cognition is constituted by judgments that 
things are “the same” (?) or “different” (?), of one kind or another (Fraser 2005), 
fundamentally emotions are triggered by the agent’s dispositions to see particular things or 
situations as similar or dissimilar in various respects.32 Such dispositions are regarded as 
open to modification through either persuasion or habituation. By reflecting on and 
habituating oneself to attend to certain respects in which things are similar or different rather 
than others, agents can guide and train their emotional responses to things—and presumably 
their preferences and aversions as well.  
This point is important in understanding Zhuangist justifications for the Virtuoso 
View and the rhetoric by which the texts attempt to modify the audience’s emotions. Part of 
the virtuosity of exemplary figures such as Wáng Tái or Zǐyú, for instance, is that they “see 
the respects in which things are one” (????, 5/8), or the same, and thus are emotionally 
unperturbed by changes in their circumstances. By altering how they discriminate things as 
“the same” or “different,” “one” or “not one,” agents can modify their emotional responses. 
An agent who sees everything, including his own life, as part of “the same” unified cosmic 
process will hold no preferences regarding the outcome of changing circumstances. Such an 
agent will thus be emotionally unperturbed by any change whatsoever, just as water insects 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
(1991), which argues that Mencius holds neither a Kantian theory of practical reason, which gives reason 
priority over emotion, nor a Humean theory, which gives emotion priority over reason.  
31
 By contrast, the opening line of Xúnzǐ’s “Discourse on Music” ??? might be taken to imply that for him, 
emotions such as delight (?) are an unchangeable aspect of the human constitution, as he states that delight is 
“something human qíng surely cannot avoid” (????????).  
32
 Such dispositions are a subset of the phenomena of “seeing-as” or “seeing aspects,” to which Wittgenstein 
devoted much attention. See, e.g., Wittgenstein (1968, pp. 193ff.) and Budd (1987).  
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are unperturbed by the flow of water below them and grazing animals are unperturbed by a 
change in pasture (21/31–32).33  
To sum up, emotions are produced by evaluative attitudes invoked in particular 
instances by the cognitive-affective discrimination that things are or are not “the same” as 
some preferred or approved “kind.” Emotional responses to things can be modified in two 
ways, either by changing one’s general preferences or approvals or by changing what one 
sees as “the same” or “different,” whether in particular instances or in general. Discussions of 
emotion in the Zhuāngzǐ tend to assume a strong link between cognitive and affective 
attitudes, probably reflecting an underlying assumption that the two are interrelated. It is 
expected that persuasive rhetoric can produce changes in what agents see as similar—and 
thus what they prefer—and so can modify their emotions.  
Impediments to Virtuosity 
Given this background, we can see that Zhuangist writers have a 
psycho-physiological theory available to explain why, as one passage puts it, intense 
emotions are “impediments to dé ?” (???, 23/68–69) that interfere with the freely 
adaptive activity that constitutes “wandering.”34 Not all passages that address emotions 
explicitly allude to this theory, but many do, and it probably provided an implicit starting 
point for reflection on emotion. 
To contemporary readers, the salient aspects of negative emotions such as sorrow or 
fear are probably that they are painful or unpleasant to experience. We also recognize that 
when such emotions are especially strong, they hamper our ability to focus our attention and 
act normally or effectively.   
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 Interestingly, the same passage characterizes various components of agency—rejection, pursuit, selecting, 
giving, cognition, and ability—as “obstructions” to dào (???) (23/67–70). The passage itself advocates a 
radical stance in which agency is abandoned for the status of wú wéi ?? (non-doing). 
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For Zhuangist writers, however, the fundamental problem with intense emotions is 
that they actually physically injure the agent by disrupting the normal, healthy balance of qì 
in the body. This physiological theory explains the frequent textual references to preventing 
emotions from “entering” (?) the chest, heart, or spirit and harming the agent by disturbing 
his internal harmony (??) (5/45) or “stirring up the chest” (??) (23/69).35 As Zhuāngzǐ 
explains in the exchange with Huì Shī cited above, the point of “lacking affects” (??) is 
that the agent does not “internally injure himself with likes and dislikes” (5/57–58).36 
Zǐgāo’s stress-induced physical illness is just such an “internal injury,” one that impairs his 
“capacity” (?), so that, unlike Āi Tái Tuō’s, it is no longer “whole” or “intact” (?). Hence 
Zhòng Ní urges him to “nourish his center” (??)—to take better care of his internal 
psycho-physical health.   
The same physiological theory explains why emotions impede the agent’s ability to 
act well—that is, her ability to exercise dé in smoothly adjusting to circumstances so as to 
flow along with the Dào ?. Appropriate action in particular situations requires the capacity 
to adapt flexibly and fluidly to the situation. Emotions “bind” the agent to things, preventing 
such fluid responses. In so “binding” the agent, they block the free flow of qì through the 
heart and body and thus interfere with the agent’s ability to detect and react to features of his 
circumstances. Virtuoso action for the Zhuāngzǐ requires that the agent “fast” (?) or “empty” 
(?) the heart and employ the still, reactive, tenuous qì of his spirit and body to “listen” (?) 
to things (4/26–28), so as to respond (?) to them “like a mirror” (??) (7/32–33).37 
Emotions are “impediments to dé” (???) (23/67–70) or “diseases of dé” (???) (15/14) 
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 The notion of “listening with the qi” may be akin to the notion in modern Tàijíquán ??? of using one’s 
calm qì to “listen to force” (??). 
16   
that disturb this emptiness and equilibrium, allowing “diseased qì” (??) to “attack” (?) 
(15/9) and, presumably, stirring up the qì so that it fills the heart, leaving it “stuffed” (?) and 
congested, rather than “empty” (?) and unobstructed. By maintaining a calm, empty state of 
affective equilibrium, the virtuoso keeps his dé and spirit (?) whole (?) and free of damage 
(?) or defects (?). Thus he is able to avoid injury while succeeding in practical affairs.38  
To contemporary ears, this theory may sound alien and fantastic, especially given the 
terminology of an archaic qì metaphysics and physiology. But I submit that if we read the 
theory metaphorically and discount somewhat for rhetorical excess, it overlaps considerably 
with plausible views familiar from contemporary performance psychology. Athletes, artistic 
performers, and craftspeople in various fields are all acquainted with the association between 
virtuoso performance and a loose, open, or “empty” psychological state in which we 
unselfconsciously “forget” ourselves, become more alert and responsive to our 
circumstances, remain calm and cool under pressure, and avoid misjudgment, hasty 
decisions, and faulty actions due to emotions or cognitive biases. We all understand what one 
Zhuāngzǐ passage is getting at, for instance, when it claims that good swimmers can easily 
learn how to handle a boat because they “forget the water”: they are as at home on water as 
on land, and thus no worries about the various ways their craft might capsize enter their 
hearts and interfere with their performance (19/22–25). Similarly, many of us have personal 
experience with the following phenomenon: 
Playing for tiles, you’re skilled. Playing for fancy belt buckles, you get the shakes. 
Playing for gold, you’re a nervous wreck. Your skill is the same, but [in the latter two 
cases] there’s something you’re worrying about; this is putting weight on something 
outside yourself. Anyone who puts weight on what’s outside gets clumsy on the 
inside. (19/25–26)39  
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The more we worry about the outcome, the worse we perform. The Virtuoso View is in effect 
an extension of this truism so that it covers not merely games of skill but life as a whole. Just 
as an elite athlete or musician does not let emotions “enter” her chest to disrupt her 
competitive or artistic performance, the Virtuoso View advocates that we not allow emotions 
to disrupt our performance in life.  
Grounds for the Virtuoso View  
Before we can critically evaluate the Virtuoso View, we need to consider the grounds 
for it presented in the texts. Given the pivotal place of the Virtuoso View in the overall 
Zhuangist conception of the good life, these grounds converge and overlap with those for the 
broader eudaimonistic ideal of “wandering,” which I explore elsewhere.40 Most of the 
considerations the anthology offers in favor of the Virtuoso View are thus also considerations 
in favor of the good life of wandering.  
One justification for the Virtuoso View, as we have seen, lies in a conception of 
psycho-physiological health. Intense emotions are regarded as disrupting the normal, 
harmonious balance of qì and thus injuring the agent internally.  
Another justification is that affective equanimity is thought to have instrumental value 
in facilitating effective performance of practical tasks. One expression of this point is the 
remark about how our skill in a game suffers in inverse proportion to our emotional 
investment in the prize. Another is Zhòng Ní’s claim that Zǐgāo will be able to handle his 
mission effectively enough if he can “act on the facts of the matter and forget himself” 
(4/43–44).  
A further, deeper justification for the Virtuoso View extends these points into a 
distinctive Zhuangist conception of flourishing agency. I have suggested that the Zhuangist 
view of dé is exemplified by the intelligent, adaptive, responsive activity manifested in the 
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expert performance of skills. Such high-performance activities, I propose, are particular 
instantiations of the Zhuangist conception of a flourishing life—a life of dé and wandering. 
That is, the best kind of life, according to this eudaimonistic ideal, is one in which the agent 
constantly maintains a version of the “high-performance state” that obtains during such 
activity—to do so is just to employ dé in wandering. Typically, a constitutive element of 
high-performance activity is the sort of affective state the Virtuoso View describes. Since the 
Virtuoso View articulates the affective dimension of such activity, a justification for the 
eudaimonistic ideal concurrently yields a justification for it.  
The preceding grounds are implicit in the connections between the Virtuoso View and 
various Zhuangist values. But the Zhuāngzǐ also argues explicitly for the Virtuoso View, or at 
least a closely related stance. The most common such argument is that this view is an 
appropriate response to the nature of reality and the human predicament, as the Zhuangist 
tradition construes them. The texts stress that we live in a world of constant flux and 
transformation, subject to forces we can neither control nor fully comprehend, in which our 
aims are often frustrated and things we value frequently pass away.41 Acknowledging these 
points is supposed to convert us to the Virtuoso View. Zhòng Ní, for instance, expects Zǐgāo 
to achieve affective equanimity by recognizing that some events “we can’t do anything 
about”; he will thus come to peace with them, “as with fate.”42 Zǐyú and, in a parallel 
passage, a man named Qín Shī ?? assume that once we see how gain and loss are a matter 
of the “moment” or “time” (?), we will be “at ease with the moment and dwell in the flow.” 
Those who cannot shift along with the flow will be punished emotionally for “fleeing from 
Nature” (??, 3/17–19), for nothing can “overcome Nature” (??, 6/52–53). Sūn Shū Áo 
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explains that he had no strong emotional reactions to his repeated political promotions and 
dismissals, as he regarded these as inevitable, gain and loss ultimately being beyond his 
control (21/62–65). Zhuāngzǐ recovered from grief over his wife’s death when he recognized 
how her death was part of an inexorable process, such as the procession of the four seasons 
(18/18),43 and concluded that continuing to mourn her showed he was “incompetent with 
respect to fate” (????, 18/19). 
  A core, repeated Zhuangist contention, then, is that cognitive acknowledgement of 
our inefficacy in the face of “the inevitable” (???) or “fate” (?) justifies and produces 
affective equanimity. The idea seems to be that once we properly recognize the limits of our 
efficacy as agents, we will withdraw any intense emotional investment from things that fall 
outside the scope of our control. Clearly, however, people often do have emotional 
investments in things that are beyond their power. To give a trivial example, many people are 
invested emotionally in how their national team performs in World Cup soccer. So the route 
from acknowledging our inefficacy to adopting the Virtuoso View is not a direct one. If it is 
to work, the justification requires some intermediate steps.  
I suggest that these steps may run roughly as follows. For the Zhuāngzǐ, dé is our 
Nature-given capacity to exercise agency in navigating Dào. As human beings, we have a 
fundamental, instinctive inclination to employ our dé, or exert our capacity for agency. Once 
we recognize the limits to our efficacy, we see that adopting certain kinds of aims and 
commitments tends to frustrate this inclination. We will exercise dé more effectively and 
enjoy a more fulfilling life if we reorient ourselves toward aims and commitments that offer a 
greater chance of success. But success in pursuing any particular aim or commitment is 
contingent (??) on “external things” (??) over which we have no control (??). 
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Moreover, “external things can’t be taken for certain” (26/1).44 Only a wholly “internal” 
project—one not contingent (??) on anything “external”—can enable us to transcend 
contingency, ensuring that success lies entirely in our power. But there is only one such 
project: the higher-order project of the practice of dé itself—or, identically, the project of 
“wandering.” 
If we adopt this as our core project, then we identify with the process of wandering 
itself—a process that is itself free of contingency, insofar as it consists precisely in continual 
adaptation to contingently changing circumstances. (To commit to wandering in this way 
amounts also to committing to follow Dào; so it probably also entails identifying with the 
“Great Dào” of the cosmos.45) Our core values or commitments thus shift away from what 
we cannot control to what we can. We focus on the higher-order, ongoing process of 
wandering, rather than on the outcome of any particular first-order activity. Having identified 
with this “constant” (?), higher-order project, we experience affective equanimity, for we 
“bind” ourselves to no particular external things and our aims can be neither wholly 
completed (as wandering continues indefinitely) nor defeated (as we can wander with 
virtuosity regardless of external circumstances). As some Zhuāngzǐ passages indicate,46 
wandering itself can produce emotions of ease, happiness, or fulfillment, much as a virtuoso 
performer is likely to experience satisfaction or fulfillment during a performance.  
Through a certain conception of dé and its fulfillment, then, reflection on “the 
inevitable” and our place in the cosmic process of transformation may justify and motivate a 
life of wandering and with it the Virtuoso View. But why accept this conception of dé—and 
the conception of flourishing agency I am proposing goes hand-in-hand with it? The 
Zhuangist stance is that this construal of dé represents the fullest expression of our natural 
                                                           
44 ?????? 
45
 Since our death is part of Dào, this is at the same time a commitment to eventually facing and accepting our 
own death. 
21   
capacities (?) as human beings. Fundamentally, what we are is creatures who are able to 
employ dé in this fashion—to exert powers of intelligent, critical, responsive, flexible agency 
in undertaking particular projects while simultaneously maintaining critical awareness of the 
limitations of these projects, the plurality of alternative projects, and the place of our lives 
and activity in the “Big Picture,” the cosmic perspective of Nature (?) or the “Great Dào.” 
The flourishing exercise of dé—the fullest application of our powers of agency—requires 
that we “dwell in the flow,” in such a way that our emotional ties to “external things” are 
always provisional, transitory, and easily released. The result is emotional equanimity. The 
justification for the Virtuoso View is thus partly aesthetic, in that it identifies certain features 
of our activity as the highest, finest, or most admirable, and partly teleological, in that it 
claims that such a life best fulfills our capacities. 
Other Zhuangist Views of Emotion 
As I indicated at the outset, the Virtuoso View is a construction based on diverse 
theoretical elements presented in different Zhuāngzǐ passages. Moreover, it is surely not the 
only view of emotion found in the Zhuāngzǐ. At least two other views are prominent, one 
more moderate than the Virtuoso View, one more radical.47 The first is illustrated by the 
story of Zhuāngzǐ’s wife dying (18/15–19). At first, Zhuāngzǐ grieves for his loss; only later 
does he begin to place his wife’s death in the context of natural transformations, until he 
eventually recovers from his grief. I take this to imply that, contrary to the Virtuoso View, he 
first allows grief to “enter,” and only later recovers equanimity and moves on.48 The second, 
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 Olberding (2007) and Chan (forthcoming) both identify at least two distinct views of emotion in the 
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more radical view characterizes the sage as merging so wholly with natural patterns as to 
have no emotions whatsoever. Such a figure ceases to exercise agency or live a recognizably 
human life at all. He is like “an infant,” who “acts without knowing what he is doing, moves 
without knowing where he is going, his body like the limb of a withered tree and heart like 
dead ashes” (23/41).49 He lives “as if drifting”; he “does not think or deliberate, does not 
plan ahead,” but instead “moves only when pushed” (15/12).50 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, I will largely set these other views aside. 
The radical view is too implausible; it amounts to the extinction of human agency in pursuit 
of complete spiritual union with nature.51 It founders on a single fundamental problem: given 
that human life, like that of all other creatures, is part of and issues from the Dào of Nature, 
how can the finest way of life for us possibly be to abandon our most distinctive feature—our 
Nature-given capacity for agency?52 On the other hand, the moderate view seems easily 
defensible on commonsense grounds, but it fails to fully do justice to the considerations the 
Zhuāngzǐ offers in favor of the Virtuoso View.  
My concern in the remainder of the paper, then, will be to consider several potential 
objections to the Virtuoso View, in order to explore to what extent it may be defensible. 
Perhaps the Virtuoso View inevitably slides into the radical view, in which case it should be 
rejected. Or perhaps in the end it is not really distinct from the moderate view. In that case it 
might be defensible, but less challenging or distinctive than it seems at first glance.  
Abandoning Intentionality? 
In this and the next two sections, I will briefly consider several of the most important 
objections that might be raised against the Virtuoso View. The complexity and depth of these 
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objections precludes addressing them thoroughly in a short essay, but I can at least suggest 
roughly how an adequate response might run.   
The first and most fundamental objection is that by advocating affective equanimity 
toward the outcomes of the various particular projects in our lives, the Virtuoso View may in 
effect be indirectly advocating that we abandon intentionality and thus agency. I have 
proposed that the Virtuoso View is part of a package of Zhuangist ideas that depict a life in 
which we exert our powers of agency in the fullest, most flourishing way. The objection is 
that on the contrary, a life without deep emotional commitments would be one in which we 
fail to exert agency at all.53 Perhaps the simplest way to make this point is simply to observe 
that if we do not care deeply about anything, then we will lack motivation to act and may 
cease to employ agency. A more profound and elaborate way of articulating roughly the same 
idea emerges from Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of Dasein, the way of being 
distinctive of agents such as ourselves. Heidegger famously proposes that Sorge—“care,” 
including concern about things and solicitude for others—is the unifying, fundamental 
feature of Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world (1962, 237ff.). By “care,” of course, Heidegger 
is not referring simply to particular emotions such as worry or grief, but to a feature of the 
existential-ontological structure of our way of being (1962, 241). Still, a consequence of his 
interpretation of this structure is that some form of affective commitment is integral to the 
sort of intentionality characteristic of Dasein and thus of human agency. This objection also 
highlights an internal tension in the Zhuangist view as I presented it. I suggested that the 
Virtuoso View is akin to an extrapolation of familiar features of performance psychology to 
life as a whole. But one might object that this extrapolation is misconceived, or is perhaps 
even a category mistake. Performance psychology concerns how to effectively pursue 
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practical aims or purposes to which we have committed ourselves. Virtuosity is generally 
defined with respect to such aims or purposes; without commitment to some aim or purpose, 
the concept becomes empty. Yet any such commitment entails some degree of affective 
involvement. So there can be no such thing as virtuosity without affective involvement.  
I think these objections do tell against the radical view of emotion described in the 
preceding section. But the Virtuoso View, as I have attempted to articulate it, does not 
advocate totally forsaking all affective attitudes and abandoning all commitments to 
particular projects. The texts do not imply that figures such as Wáng Tái, Āi Tái Tuō, or Sūn 
Shū Áo undertake no projects at all. Just the contrary: Sūn Shū Áo, for example, three times 
accepted appointment as premier of his state. In the Zǐgāo story, Zhòng Ní explicitly claims 
that all of us inevitably find ourselves with certain commitments, minimally to our family and 
state. And of course the various Zhuangist exemplars of virtuosity in practical skills—such as 
Páo Dīng ?? the butcher—make commitments and pursue concrete aims.54 What the 
Virtuoso View advocates is that our fundamental commitment be to the higher-order project 
of wandering, or the life of dé. As part of that higher-order project, we will make numerous 
provisional, conditional commitments to particular projects—just as, while wandering 
through a foreign city while sightseeing, at any one time we will provisionally commit to 
traveling in one direction or another. To wander is not to remain motionless; nor is it merely 
to “drift,” as the radical sage is said to do (15/12).  
As to whether there is such a thing as a sort of overarching, higher-order virtuosity in 
life, distinct from virtuosity in particular, concrete skills or activities, I suggest that a 
generalized conception of virtuosity can be delineated by abstracting features common to 
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various particular forms of virtuosity. The virtuoso of life realizes such features both in how 
he handles particular projects and in how he approaches life as a whole.  
A Fundamental Tension 
Another critical question we might raise is whether the Virtuoso View might be 
fundamentally incoherent, leaving us with a schizophrenic conception of agency. The 
Virtuoso View conceives of agency as in effect comprising two simultaneous, contrasting 
moments or dimensions. Through the first moment—the “engaged” moment—we commit to 
particular activities or projects. Through the second—the “wandering” moment—we look 
beyond these, situating them within the context of the Great Dào of the cosmos and treating 
them as contingent, subordinate parts of an ongoing flow of virtuoso activity.55 This second 
moment renders us always ready to detach from a commitment if circumstances make doing 
so the most appropriate way to “dwell in the flow.” (For example, we would detach ourselves 
from many of our commitments if a calamity forced us to dramatically change our life plans.) 
A critic might object that these dual moments are incompatible or that they make genuine 
commitment to particular projects impossible. The critic might doubt whether we can really 
be committed to a project while simultaneously appreciating its contingency and being 
prepared to relinquish it.56 Perhaps the potential for detachment provided by the second 
moment of agency might interfere with our capacity for commitment and perseverance, by 
launching a slide into nihilism, indecisiveness, or indifference.  
The possibility of such interference is unavoidable, I think. Indeed, most of us have 
experienced it at one time or another. Yet I contend that the potential conflict between the 
two moments is not a defect of the Virtuoso View. To the contrary, this conflict is 
manageable, and indeed it is essential to a fully human way of life.  
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The grounds for claiming that the conflict between the moments is manageable are 
that, as a matter of fact, many people do manage it successfully in their daily lives. For 
example, for several weeks now, I have been strongly committed to the project of writing this 
essay. Researching and planning it has taken up much of my time. This project is meaningful 
to me. My commitment to it and related projects forms part of my self-identity. However, I 
am also acutely aware that the project is an expression of intellectual interests that by the 
standards of mainstream society are marginal and largely inconsequential. The project is 
likely to be of vanishingly little significance even in my tiny subfield within contemporary 
academia, let alone in 21st-century world philosophy, the scope of human history, or the 
broader cosmic scheme. If circumstances forced me to drop the project entirely, I would let it 
go with at most only mild, passing regret and simply look for a worthwhile new direction in 
which to exert agency and reshape my identity.  
To be sure, as the hypothetical critic worries, an obsession with the contingency of 
our lives and values might generate nihilism, an excessively critical pessimism, or an 
inability to appreciate goods or persevere in projects. But equally, commitment without 
appreciation of contingency can easily produce dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and 
frustration. Performance psychology indicates that developing the “wandering” moment of 
agency contributes to our capacity for virtuoso performance. I suggest that this moment is 
probably also an element of robust mental health. More profoundly, to fail to find a balance 
between the engaged and wandering moments—and thus exert our ability to engage in 
Zhuangist wandering—is simply to fail to adequately develop our cognitive and affective 
capacities. A proponent of the Virtuoso View would also contend that failure to find a 
balance between the two constitutes a failure to acknowledge reality—it amounts to “fleeing 
from Nature and turning one’s back on reality” (3/17), rather than competently integrating the 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
56
 Wong (2003, 409) raises such a concern, suggesting that “detachment and engagement cannot coexist at the 
27   
spheres of “Nature” (?) and “the human” (?). Flourishing human agency requires bringing 
both moments into play. On the Zhuangist view, what we fundamentally are is “wanderers of 
the Way,” and an authentic human life—a life of dé—is a life of such wandering. Wandering 
involves simultaneously balancing commitments to particular projects with a grasp of broader 
contexts and the place of our projects within them, while also making a higher-level 
commitment to wandering itself. Given the facts about Nature and fate (?, also “mandate”), 
humans are in effect “mandated to wander,” whether or not we do so willingly and in 
self-awareness. The question is not whether to live a life of wandering; it is how to do so with 
virtuosity.  
The Virtuoso View as I have developed it here converges in several respects with the 
views of two important 20th-century philosophers. One is Thomas Nagel, who in several 
works has explored the tension between two contrasting standpoints human beings can take 
up toward themselves and their lives.57 The first is an internal, subjective standpoint in which 
we engage with various purposes and projects; the second is an external, objective standpoint 
in which we step back to survey our lives with detachment. Nagel links the tension between 
these standpoints to philosophical problems concerning the meaning of life, personal identity, 
and agent-centered versus agent-neutral approaches to ethics, among other issues. Yet he 
insists that “there is no credible way of eliminating the inner conflict” produced by our ability 
to take up these two standpoints (1986, 221). Rather, the tension between them is “one of the 
most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting 
characteristics” (1979, 23). An acute sense of this tension “is the opposite of self-denial and 
the result of full awareness” (1986, 223).  
The other thinker I have in mind is Heidegger, whom I mentioned earlier. On the one 
hand, Heidegger contends that “care” and a consequent “resoluteness” are fundamental 
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aspects of our way of being as agents.58 But on the other hand, he also contends that 
“authentic resoluteness” simultaneously requires both an attitude of committed 
“holding-for-true” toward what is disclosed by our way of life and “a resolute 
holding-oneself-free for taking back” (1962, 355). As John Haugeland glosses this point, 
“resoluteness cannot become rigidly set in its ways about its situation, but rather must be held 
open and free for whatever its current possibility is. In particular, it must hold itself free for a 
possible—and, in each case, necessary—taking it back” (2000, 68; original italics). For 
Heidegger, this dual structure of commitment and “holding-oneself-free” to withdraw that 
commitment explains how “Dasein becomes free…from the events of the world” (1963, 
358). It stands at the core of his conception of the authentic life.   
A Good Life? 
A third set of objections concerns the place of emotions in the good life. A critic 
might argue that some emotions—such as intense joy—have intrinsic value. A life without 
them might thus seem less good than one in which they regularly occur.59 Or a critic could 
argue that emotions such as joy and grief may be justified responses to value. Their absence 
thus might signal a lack of proper appreciation of value. When Huì Shī ?? castigates 
Zhuāngzǐ for celebrating, rather than mourning, his wife’s death, he enumerates events of 
value in their married life—such that she was his partner in raising children—implying that 
Zhuāngzǐ’s conduct demonstrates a failure to appreciate them properly (18/15–19). A life 
without such appreciation of value may be one that is thereby less good. If emotions are a 
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 See especially Nagel (1979, 11–23, 196–213) and (1986, 214–223). 
58 As John Haugeland explains (1982, 24), “resoluteness” refers to a self-understanding that claims one’s roles 
in life as one’s own, by one’s own choice, and thus resolves conflicts that may produce an inconsistent 
self-understanding. “Insofar as self-understanding critically takes over its roles” and achieves resoluteness, it is 
“self-owned” or “authentic” (eigentlich).  
59
 Naturally, by the same token, intense negative emotions, such as grief, would detract from the value of life. A 
life of pleasant equanimity might thus be equally good or better than one that mixes intense positive and 
negative emotional experiences, unless the negative emotions were significantly outweighed by positive ones. 
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necessary part of appreciating value, then the Virtuoso View may advocate a life that is 
defective, at least by some standards of value.  
Both these potential objections are variations on an underlying general worry, namely 
that in endorsing a life of affective equanimity, or at least a life in which the four intense 
emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and delight rarely or never occur, the Virtuoso View is 
neglecting crucial features of a good human life.60 
Before addressing this line of objection, we should reiterate that the Virtuoso View 
need not advocate the total absence of emotion. It is committed only to rejecting intense, 
disruptive emotional states that impair our dé. Any particular project an agent might pursue 
necessitates applying action-guiding value distinctions, such as provisional shì-fēi 
distinctions.61 Since, as I explained earlier, such distinctions probably include an affective 
component, the Virtuoso View can allow for mild affective responses to circumstances and 
thus the appreciation of value through such responses. It insists only that such emotional 
responses not be so strong as to disrupt the prevailing general state of calm or ease associated 
with “dwelling in the flow,” so that our dé or capacities (cái ?) remain unimpaired.62   
A quick, preliminary response to this third set of objections would be to point out that, 
in the Zhuāngzǐ’s native intellectual context, against the backdrop of the 
psycho-physiological qì theory described earlier, intense emotions are regarded as injurious 
to health. Thus they actually impede, not foster, the agent’s ability to participate in or 
appreciate valuable aspects of life. The Virtuoso View purports to solve this 
                                                           
60
 This is also one aspect of the general criticism, articulated in the Xúnzǐ, that the Zhuāngzǐ injudiciously favors 
the perspective of Nature (?) over that of “the human” (?). See Xúnzǐ Yǐndé ???? (A Concordance to 
Xúnzǐ ) (1986), Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 22 (reprint) (Shànghǎi: 
Shànghǎi Gǔjí), 21/22. 
61
 Of course, many Zhuāngzǐ passages famously advocate that we not intentionally guide action by fixed shì-fēi 
distinctions. Nevertheless, even if action is produced through a contextual, responsive process, in the course of 
any action we will implicitly draw such distinctions, though they may be provisional, flexible, and contingent on 
the particular situation. 
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psycho-physiological problem and so enhance the goodness of the agent’s life. Even if we set 
aside early Chinese psycho-physiological beliefs, I think a parallel claim is to some extent 
defensible, insofar as we can agree with Zhuangist writers that powerful emotions can so 
severely disrupt our ability to function normally as to render us unable to appreciate or realize 
any value at all. However, for the sake of discussion, let’s set this point aside. Indeed, let’s 
set aside the entire justification for the Virtuoso View given earlier and examine only new 
considerations. 
Faced with these objections that intense emotions contribute to a good life, an 
advocate of the Virtuoso View could probably offer two fresh points in its defense. First, it is 
doubtful that intense emotion is an indispensable modality through which we appreciate 
value. An agent can fully appreciate the value of something without feeling strong emotions 
about it. Consider Zhuāngzǐ’s status once he comes to see his wife’s death in the context of 
natural processes and recovers from his initial grief (18/15–19). Although his sorrow has 
passed, he strongly affirms the value of her life. Indeed, it is a normal and nearly universal 
experience for us to continue to appreciate the value of things or events, whether positive or 
negative, long after our initial emotional response to them has faded and we have recovered 
affective equilibrium. The Virtuoso View merely advocates that this normal adjustment 
process take place much more quickly—preferably instantaneously—than it does for most 
people. This difference in the rate and ease of adjustment is part of what makes the Zhuangist 
virtuoso a “virtuoso”: like a virtuoso in any other field, she handles difficult adjustments 
more adeptly than other people do.63 
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 Olberding (2007) also develops an interpretation on which Zhuangist Daoism might sanction a certain range 
of emotional responses, which she argues are essential components of the conception of human flourishing she 
finds in the text. 
63 As Fox (1996) puts it, the text is in effect describing the behavior and attitudes of the perfectly well-adjusted 
person, someone wholly at ease in all situations. As he observes, it is unclear whether Zhuangists advocate that 
everyone should or could be like this.  
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Second, arguably the Virtuoso View exchanges certain familiar affective 
experiences—such as the four intense emotions—for other, more sophisticated affective 
experiences that are of greater value. By contextualizing mundane human events such as birth 
and death within an overarching cosmic order, the Virtuoso View may lead to deeper, more 
profound appreciation of their value, as illustrated by Zhuāngzǐ’s considered appreciation of 
his wife’s life. It may yield appreciation of values the agent previously overlooked, as when 
Lǎozǐ claims (21/24–38) that by identifying with the Dào-totality and the cosmic process of 
transformation, achieving affective equanimity, and “letting the heart wander in the 
beginning of things,” he has experienced “ultimate beauty and ultimate happiness.” And it 
may yield fulfillment and satisfaction from the peak employment of our capacities, as 
illustrated by Páo Dīng’s satisfaction upon finishing a piece of work (3/11).64 
Still, we should acknowledge that some Zhuāngzǐ passages do slide from descriptions 
suggestive of the Virtuoso View into more radical claims—claims that might legitimately 
prompt worries along the lines of the “good life” objection.65  
Consider the story of Mèngsūn Cái ???, as related by Yán Huí ?? and Zhòng 
Ní (6/75–82). When his mother died, Mèngsūn displayed no grief and felt no emotional 
disturbance. He merely carried out her funeral competently, in accordance with social 
expectations. Unlike Zhuāngzǐ, who needed time to recover emotionally after his wife’s 
death, Mèngsūn adjusted instantly. Clearly, however, he also respected social mores and 
others’ reactions; he wailed aloud at his mother’s funeral in order to accompany the other 
mourners, who were genuinely distressed. In these respects, his attitudes and conduct seem to 
square with the Virtuoso View. At least initially, the story does not present him as a 
                                                           
64
 Heidegger makes a parallel observation when he remarks, of authentic resoluteness, that “along with the 
sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an 
unshakable joy in this possibility” (1962, 358). That is, in the authentic exercise of agency, the simultaneous, 
dual movement of commitment and holding back, while recognizing the various possibilities open to us, 
produces a form of joy. 
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supra-human sage who has transcended mundane human concerns. But Zhòng Ní goes on to 
remark that “Mr. Mèngsūn doesn’t know why things live, nor why they die; he doesn’t know 
to take the lead, nor to follow behind. It’s as if he has transformed into a thing that merely 
awaits [further] transformations that he doesn’t know about, that’s all” (6/77–78).66 The 
passage goes on to question the basis of self-identity and to imply that the ideal state is one in 
which we simply flow along with natural transformations, accept “the arrangement” (?) and 
“enter the unity of the empty sky” (??????—phrases we might read as implying that 
Mèngsūn has relinquished the basis of agency. Thus the passage ultimately seems to present a 
quite radical vision of the good life, one that diverges considerably from the Virtuoso View 
or other ideals to which we can easily relate.67  
I suggest that this passage reflects an inherent conflict in much Daoist thought 
between, on the one hand, self-fulfillment and virtuoso agency, and, on the other, a critical 
grasp of the limitations of our knowledge, acknowledgment of the mystery and 
indeterminateness of the self, and recognition of our place in the broader cosmic picture. 
Some Zhuāngzǐ passages maintain a balance between these dimensions of human life. Others, 
such as this one, tip toward a more extreme view, in this case recommending that we take up 
the cosmic standpoint and “enter the unity of the empty sky,” an image that echoes the radical 
ideal of relinquishing individual agency in order to “merge with the power of Nature” (??
?) (15/13–14). (In the original Chinese, a single word, tiān ?, refers here to both the sky 
and Nature.) This conflict represents one aspect of perhaps the fundamental problematic of 
Daoist philosophy: the appropriate relation between the realm of “Nature” (?) and that of 
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 Olberding (2007) calls attention to the conflicts between such passages and more moderate ones, such as 
Zhuāngzǐ’s response to his wife’s death. 
66
 ???????????????????????????????????????? 
67
 Yearley (1983) long ago noted the distance between this “radical” side of Zhuangist thought and mundane 
human values. Olberding (2007) sees the equanimity displayed by Mèngsūn as leading to a life that is less good 
than one that makes room for grief and ensuing adaptation, as illustrated in the story of Zhuāngzǐ’s wife’s death.  
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“the human” (?). Taken as a whole, the Zhuāngzǐ presents an extended conversation on this 
problematic, in which different passages throughout the anthology explore different 
positions. 
Concluding Remarks 
Core elements of the Virtuoso View are surely plausible, and arguably the view as a 
whole is as well. The Virtuoso View may exaggerate somewhat by depicting the virtuoso as 
experiencing no disruptive emotions whatsoever. Perhaps the virtuoso is instead comparable 
to an athlete whose concentration on the ongoing flow of the game pushes emotions from the 
center of consciousness to the far periphery, such that even though they are not wholly 
eliminated, their effects are minimized. But a Zhuangist proponent might reply that the 
athlete illustrates exactly what is meant by not allowing emotions to “enter” the chest and 
disrupt the agent’s psycho-physiological harmony. The virtuoso ideal simply extends the 
familiar phenomenon observed in the athlete to our performance in life as a whole. Again, the 
Virtuoso View may exaggerate in treating all of life as an extended “performance state.” For 
it seems that sometimes we do not “perform,” but only observe, contemplate, appreciate, and 
so forth. Yet a defender of the Virtuoso View could plausibly reply that these activities are all 
aspects or parts of the long-term performance of our life projects. One conclusion we might 
draw, then, is that the Virtuoso View is largely defensible. Perhaps it exaggerates in some 
respects, but the exaggerations are understandable, at least partly plausible, and probably 
easily mitigated.  
A critic could push for a different, more pessimistic conclusion, however. One could 
argue that the Virtuoso View tends inevitably toward a radical stance in which human agency 
is swallowed up in an identification with the totality of Nature (?) and its courses (?) of 
transformation (?). This tendency is illustrated by the story of Mèngsūn Cái and perhaps by 
other figures, such as Zǐyú, the deformed, dying friend who eagerly anticipates being 
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remolded by “the maker of things” (???, 6/47–48) into whatever contingent form might 
happen to come next. 
As a closing thought, I want to suggest that this potentially radical consequence of the 
Virtuoso View—or, alternatively, the running conflict in the Zhuāngzǐ between the Virtuoso 
View of emotion and the radical view—simply reflects the inescapable Nagelian conflict 
between subjective commitment to our particular lives and projects and the transcendent, 
objective stance that our critical and reflective capacities enable us to adopt, in which we 
view our concerns in a broader context. In Zhuangist terms, this conflict maps roughly onto 
the distinction between “the human” and “Nature” or the “Great Dào.” It is no surprise that 
Zhuangist discourse does not fully resolve the conflict between these stances, since, as Nagel 
himself emphasizes (1986, 221), it is probably ineliminable. It represents a genuine 
dichotomy in our nature and self-understanding, one that arises from spontaneous 
employment of our capacities for thought and agency. Some Zhuāngzǐ passages do, however, 
affirm the possibility of balancing these two dimensions of agency (see, e.g., 6/20 and 
17/50–53),68 such that, as one passage puts it, “Neither Nature nor the human defeats the 
other” (6/20).69 As in Heidegger, such a balance is associated with a conception of 
authenticity: a person who achieves it has “returned to the authentic” (???, 17/53) or 
become an “authentic human” (??, 6/20). Heidegger and Nagel, I believe, are correct to 
contend that in the fullest realization of human agency, the contrasting moments of 
engagement and wandering operate simultaneously. I conclude that this mode of agency 
converges in many respects with the Virtuoso View and the Zhuangist ideal of dé.70  
                                                           
68 For an insightful discussion of this balance, see Puett (2003), who concludes that this strand of Zhuangist 
thought aims not at “transcendence of the human but rather a continuation and perfection of the Heaven within 
man” (258).  
69 ???????? 
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 An earlier version of this paper was presented at “Reflection on Philosophical Roots of Korean Emotion: 
Emotion in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism,” Chonnam National University, Gwangju, South Korea, 
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